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Africa
The ICC’s awful timing

Paul Moorcraft
05 March 2009
First Drafts - The Prospect magazine blog

Yesterday the International Criminal Court in The Hague (the ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for alleged war crimes in Darfur. He is the first sitting head of government targeted by the court.

Banging up Bashir might massage a few tender consciences in the west. But what will the real impact be in Africa, and how will it affect efforts to lock up nasty despots (like Mugabe) who are still in power?

Bashir, who came to power in an Islamist coup in Khartoum in 1989, has collected a lot of enemies. But the indictment has stoked nationalist fervour in Sudan, and both opponents and allies now are likely to rally around him.

Sudan, in fact, has often proved the law of unintended consequences. The US economic sanctions imposed since 1997 have insulated the country from the western economic meltdown; while the rest of the world suffers, the cranes that dominate Khartoum’s skyline are evidence of the booming economy. And now the ICC action will strengthen al-Bashir both at home and abroad: domestically, it will make him a poster-boy for supporters of all parties, and he will probably comfortably win the presidential elections scheduled for later this year. Internationally, African leaders, even if they dislike Bashir, will back him against the ICC, because Sudan has become the lightning rod of a growing African impatience with diktats from the west.

At face value, critics of the ICC have a point. While claiming universal jurisdiction, the court is simply not international. More than half the world’s population has not signed up, including the USA, Russia, China and India. So far, the ICC has pursued cases only in Africa, and has not investigated any western complicity in alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, whether they be in Iraq, Afghanistan, or most recently in Gaza.

While disdaining the court, Washington nevertheless acquiesced in the UN Security Council referral of Darfur to the ICC (while, of course, demanding immunity for its own citizens). To many observers this is precisely the sort of political vendetta the US had itself warned that the ICC might be used for.

The ICC action, however, may serve as a warning shot for other regimes, such as Mugabe’s. But peace must precede justice, however you define the term, and Bashir’s arrest warrant could fatally undermine the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended Africa’s longest war, between the north and south of Sudan.

The ICC’s timing has never been good. Just as the Lord’s Resistance Army was about to end decades of conflict and make peace with the Ugandan government, the court’s arrest warrants delayed an imminent settlement. And just this month, Khartoum’s peace talks with Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement rebels were prospering. Now the war in Darfur could intensify. Wasn’t the ICC supposed to help end this tragedy?


Africa
Political solution is needed to Horn of Africa piracy

Paul Moorcraft
19 December 2008
Business Day

LIFE once more imitates art. Captain Jack Sparrow became a Hollywood idol after the success of the three Pirates of the Caribbean films. In real life, piracy has become the curse of maritime trade, especially around the Horn of Africa.

The cause of the anarchy at sea has been the chaos on land. Somalia is a failed state. This year has witnessed 100 pirate attacks in the region, the most famous the capture of the Saudi Aramco mega-tanker, the Sirius Star. The ship’s displacement is three times that of a US aircraft carrier, and it was hijacked 450 nautical miles southeast of Mombasa.

The average ransom demand has risen from $300000 last year to $3m this year. This is big money for one of the world’s poorest countries. Somalia, though, is not a state, and probably never will be again. Somaliland looks to secession and future international recognition. Puntland, the heartland of the Muslim buccaneers, has become a pirate state. The central government in Mogadishu is in its usual disarray, and the south of the country is controlled more or less by Islamist warlords.

In Puntland, piracy is a highly lucrative, socially acceptable, fashionable, lifestyle. The pirates have the best houses, prettiest women, and newest cars and guns. Among the pirates are former fishermen, who can argue with some justice that international fleets have robbed them of their livelihood by overfishing in unprotected national and international waters. So their argument that they are vigilante coastguards carries some weight, at least in Somalia. They have been joined by fighters from the clan warlords. The maritime skills are provided by the former, the military muscle by the latter.

The third operational component is the computer geeks, who operate the satellite phones, GPS equipment, etc.

The piracy is well-organised and, a rarity in Somali life, based on multi-clan co-operation.
The motivation initially was money. Then it became politicised. The Union of Islamic Courts, after being ousted from Mogadishu by the US-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006-07, began to deploy the pirates as the naval wing of their renewed insurgency.

The plunder from piracy is further corrupting the whole region. This booming business has also sucked in specialist western firms, former special forces who help conduct the ransom negotiations, which involve complex deals at sea, sometimes air-drops from Kenya, but sometimes co-ordinated by specialists in London.

Nato has diverted naval assets to the region, with little result. This month, in its first naval operation, the European Union sent out a task force of eight ships, commanded from London . Other countries, such as India and Russia, are independently patrolling. The French have been the most robust, taking the war to the pirates’ bases in one dramatic raid.

Foreign naval forces have acted because African navies are largely ineffective, with the marginal exceptions of Nigeria, SA and Egypt.

The Gulf of Aden has become the most dangerous — despite now being the most patrolled — maritime route in the world. The disruption has caused huge hikes in shipping costs, not least insurance premiums, in a market devastated by the world slump.

Very large crude carriers, such as the Sirius Star, are too big to transit the Suez Canal, but even the smaller vessels are now choosing the South African Cape route. The longer route adds nearly $1m for additional fuel, labour and the extra seven days’ transit time.

Although Washington has over-egged the Islamist threat and al-Qaeda links to the Somali crisis, the comparison with Afghanistan before 9/11 carries some weight. The state-sponsorship of terrorism and piracy is a growing threat.

Some naval experts have advocated strikes on the pirate bases, for example bombarding and occupying the port of Eyl, the main pirate base in Puntland. But the Law of the Sea Convention places limits on such daring action.

Recent United Nations resolutions have tried to enact new legislation for piracy in international waters, while antipiracy operations in Somali waters require the agreement of the ineffectual transitional government in Mogadishu. Short of declaring war, clearing out the pirates’ nests is not, yet, an option.

Maritime law also imposes restrictions on arming merchant vessels. Increasingly, however, former military experts are defending the big ships. More common measures are protected convoys through dangerous areas.

The lack of decisive naval action and the anarchy on land have allowed the pirates to launch bigger, bolder, and smarter attacks. Ethiopian troops are scheduled to pull out of Mogadishu shortly, and a beefed-up African Union (AU) force, currently 3400 troops from Burundi and Uganda, is supposed to hold the ring. A much bigger AU component won’t happen, nor will the AU’s request that a large UN peacekeeping replacement become a reality.

As ever, outside military action provides no long-term solutions to Africa’s gut-wrenching failure of governance. Africa’s problems have largely been tribal, but Somalia boasts one people, one language and one religion. Yet the collapse has been comprehensive. The multiple crises will not permit a single solution.

But first the old Organisation of African Unity shibboleth must be ditched. Somalia cannot be put together. Somaliland in the north has a functioning government but no recognition. The transitional government in Mogadishu enjoys recognition but doesn’t function. SA has warmed to the aspirations of Somaliland, so this could be a start to resolving Somalia.

Everyone looks to the new black US president to help. Barack Obama may indeed take a less ideological approach to the region’s multiple ills. The Union of Islamic Courts did bring a harsh semblance of governance and order, just as the Taliban once did in Afghanistan. The US could move to accept deals with both Islamic groups as part of a necessary wider political settlement.

As in the Balkans, a slew of new states may emerge: potentially fractious, yes, but surely better than the current anarchy. The skull-and-crossbones policy of the Somalis will wither, not because of western warships, but only through political engagement.
A settlement, based on partition, or federation, is possible. New governance, not gunboats, is the only way to banish the Somali clones of Captain Jack Sparrow.

Africa
UN at sixes and sevens over two African crises

Paul Moorcraft
July 16 2008
Business Day

THE United Nations (UN) is tying itself in knots again. At the security council, Britain shot itself in the foot by failing to get new sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, because Russia and China vetoed the plan.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown had trumpeted the anti-Mugabe measures as a success at the recent Group of Eight meeting in Japan. The British foreign office had assumed that Russia would agree and China would probably abstain. Instead, both unexpectedly used their security council veto. Britain, the US and the European Union were left looking foolish.

A part of the western cock-up at the UN was the reaction to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) decision to indict an African head of state. Not Mugabe, but Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president. This will be the first time the court’s prosecutor has tried to indict a sitting head of state.

The prosecutor, Argentinian Luis Moreno-Ocampo, is accused of a personal vendetta against Bashir, because his Latin American machismo is said to be fired up by Khartoum’s dismissal of previous indictments against minor leaders .

Moreno-Ocampo said Sudan’s “entire state apparatus” had been involved with the killings of civilians in Darfur. Three International Criminal Court (ICC) judges will now take at least six weeks to decide whether to indict Bashir.

The African Union (AU) was immediately spooked — not surprising, since many of its leaders might fare badly if invited to courts in The Hague. It issued a statement saying the search for justice should be pursued in a way “that does not impede or jeopardise efforts aimed at promoting lasting peace”.

The AU has a point — what matters for now is stopping the killing in Darfur. The same applies to Zimbabwe. It is fine for lawyers in the west to ask for the downfall of African tyrants, but what is the practical impact, not least on the long-suffering citizens of the continent’s dictatorships?

The ICC can, inter alia, initiate indictments at the request of the UN Security Council. Although distinct from the UN, the ICC move will be seen in the Sudan as a further assault by the world body. Only a short time ago, it took an immense diplomatic effort to persuade China to lean on Khartoum to accept a joint UN-AU force to take over from the failed AU peace mission in Darfur.

The UN is the glue that is holding a complex network of Sudanese agreements together. If Bashir’s indictment goes ahead, the genuine popular anger as well as
state-financed rent-a-mobs could threaten the whole UN edifice in Sudan. The
still-strong ultraconservative Islamists in Khartoum will be tempted to backtrack on all the UN-supervised deals.

That means the unravelling of the UN-supervised peace agreement which ended Africa’s longest war — the north-south conflict. It means completely derailing the stuttering Darfur peace process.

It could mean ending the massive UN humanitarian operation, not only in Darfur but also in the rest of Sudan. Tens of thousands of displaced people will starve.

Sudan could implode, possibly replicating the anarchy in Somalia.

Legal arguments also abound. Sudan is not party to the ICC-establishing treaty and it is not alone. The US, China, India and Russia, among many others, have very strong reservations about the ICC process.

Moreno-Ocampo’s move is considered destabilising by many in the UN, including those who believe in the advancement of international law. It is a question of timing, not least on the eve of a deal on punishing Mugabe, and just before the Olympics in China, whose key ally in Africa is Sudan.

And presuming the UN does not rein in Moreno-Ocampo, how exactly is Bashir to be arrested?

Despite the continental significance of the ICC move, SA’s government is more focused on the side effects. President Thabo Mbeki has a little more breathing space to get a political deal fixed in Zimbabwe. But this is a small window. The humanitarian and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is accelerating, and externally the US and the European Union will impose their own sanctions, even though SA voted against them in the security council.

Ironically, Pretoria opposes sanctions — the ANC’s beloved tool of the 1980s. Yet even the despised Afrikaner rulers got one thing right, in the end: they released Nelson Mandela, for the sake of peace talks. In stark contrast, the ICC wants to lock up Bashir, and thus destroy the peace process.

It may be morally satisfying to see tyrants such as Bashir in the dock. The unintended consequences of this week’s legal manoeuvrings, however, could be at least as tragic as the intervention in Iraq.

Western consciences might be appeased, but the people of Sudan, especially in Darfur, will be the main victims of another bout of well-meaning intervention. Alternatively, this week could break the back of the ICC, established only in 2002. Bashir could well have the last laugh.



Zimbabwe
Cold sober logic of the man who destroyed Zimbabwe

Paul Moorcraft
April 7 2008
Business Day

IT WAS his mincing manner that surprised me most. When I first interviewed Robert Mugabe in January 1980, it seemed odd in a tough guerrilla chieftain. And his articulate English was slightly contrived; almost perfect BBC. His intelligence impressed me the most, however. For four years I had interviewed many black and white political leaders in the dying Rhodesia. Mugabe was head and shoulders above them all.

Rhodesian propaganda had portrayed this Catholic-trained Marxist as a bloodthirsty latter-day Hitler. Whites were preparing for the Beit Bridge 500, the dash for the South African border, when Mugabe won the election in March 1980. Instead, the vast majority stayed, swayed by Mugabe’s clarion call for reconciliation.

Mugabe was the popular son of the masses. Only he could bring peace, and that is why the majority of Shonas voted for him. Nevertheless, his party still engaged in massive electoral intimidation.

Prefiguring by 14 years the almost saint-like quality of Nelson Mandela’s magnanimity, the new Zimbabwean president started well. He appointed a ministry of all the talents, including Rhodesian Front stalwarts. As a former teacher, Mugabe set about reforming the country’s education system, with impressive results. Later, he helped to end the civil war in Mozambique.

Had he anticipated Mandela’s style by remaining in office for just one term, Mugabe’s legacy would have been that of a world-famous statesman. Instead, in Desmond Tutu’s phrase, he became the caricature of an African despot. So what went wrong?

He may be bad, but he has never been mad. The idea that absolute power over 28 years, plus senility, caused him eventually to become demented is not convincing. Mugabe’s sober and ruthless determination has always been a mark of his character. He outflanked the original Zanu leader, Ndabaningi Sithole, then imposed his leadership during the final dramatic three years of the liberation war. Opponents were crushed.

He has displayed a logical consistency in transforming his country. The white settlers seized the land illegally in the 1890s, and thus inspired the first Chimurenga, or uprising. The second Chimurenga of 1965-79 was based partly on the historical grievances of the original resistance movements.

After taking power, Mugabe waged a third Chimurenga against all his perceived enemies: first the Ndebele, then trade unionists who supported the opposition parties, and finally white farmers and businessmen. Along the way he silenced the churches, media, judiciary, social activists and especially the gay and lesbian community.

His greatest crime was committed early in his dictatorship: the Gukurahundi in Matabeleland in the 1980s. Estimates vary, but at least 10000 Ndebeles were killed and many more were raped, tortured and abducted. It is true that South African intelligence backed a few hundred dissidents in the apartheid war of regional destabilisation, but the main reason for the devastation wrought by Mugabe’s Fifth Brigade was to eradicate the power base of Joshua Nkomo’s rival Zapu party.

Eventually, Nkomo had to sue for peace, and accept Mugabe’s one-party state. The Zanu (PF) leader stayed in power by bribing his cronies, particularly in the security services. In many African states, the military, rather than the ballot box, had been the main instrument for change of leadership. This was not possible in Zimbabwe because of a creeping coup. The generals, police chiefs and the Central Intelligence Organisation had been absorbed into the inner core of the dictatorship. They would stand and fall with their boss. This suited Mugabe’s leadership style.

The president doesn’t like being thwarted. Mugabe faced his first loss of face when he was defeated in a referendum on a draft constitution in 2000.

Blaming whites for supporting the opposition, he encouraged his thugs to seize white commercial farms, even though many farmers had been given legal land rights after 1980. This accelerated the economic meltdown. A few thousand white farmers were ejected, but hundreds of thousands of farm workers were also put out of work. Agriculture collapsed. Famine meant Mugabe’s henchmen could control the countryside by centralising the distribution of food.

The cities turned to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by Morgan Tsvangirai. Mugabe’s solution? Bulldoze the urban shantytowns. More than 700000 city dwellers lost their homes or livelihoods.

Farming had been destroyed. So had tourism. The final straw was to force foreign companies, especially mining, to give 51% control to indigenous black Zimbabweans, effectively a last handout to Mugabe’s cronies.

Under Mugabe, life expectancy has been halved; unemployment reached 80%; nearly all the whites and more than 3-million blacks fled the country. Zimbabwe became a rogue state, which threatened to implode the whole region.

His last throw was simply to print money. The inevitable result was hyperinflation. The Commonwealth turned its back, largely because of human rights abuses. And the international financial organisations deserted him because of chronic financial mismanagement and broken pledges.

Some African leaders stood by him out of a misplaced sense of solidarity, including President Thabo Mbeki, who held the economic levers. Then Jacob Zuma’s ascendancy spawned a change in the African National Congress. Tsvangirai became a much more attractive option.

The South African role in Mugabe’s long farewell is still a mystery, yet to unfold: no news yet on any deal for Mugabe’s retirement. The MDC has said it wants to follow the South African model of reconciliation, but there may be precious little truth, or justice.
Destroying one’s country with lunatic policies is not a criminal offence, but crimes against humanity, especially the genocide in Matabeleland, are different. Liberia’s Charles Taylor ended up in The Hague, but that is a special case. In theory, the International Criminal Court could try Mugabe for crimes committed after 2002, in this case the destruction of urban settlements in 2005.

The endgame will be political, not legal. China’s influence in Harare has to be finessed, and SA might have to provide rock-solid amnesties, probably in-country, not abroad, for Mugabe and his top military and police enforcers.

It could be a golden — but brief — hour for possible reconstruction. The United Nations and the International Monetary Fund will promise much, but do little. All hopes for reconstruction efforts are predicated on Mugabe’s exit.

If events turn violent, as recent clampdowns indicate, perhaps the Commonwealth, as it did in 1980, might just provide a core British-officered monitoring force. The African Union is overstretched in Darfur. The Southern African Development Community is too complicit in Mugabe’s follies.

It will take decades to rebuild the three main pillars of the economy: agriculture, tourism and mining. Is Tsvangirai capable of rebuilding from ground zero?

Mugabe had always been a master manipulator. And stubborn. Now, short of massive rigging and naked use of the army and militias, he cannot win if he has to enter a second presidential round. Worse, he could declare martial law and rule by decree.

He could have saved something of his reputation had he conceded early and gone into a dignified retirement. Instead, he has created massive uncertainty for a transition, which could yet become a second Kenya. Mugabe’s rule destroyed Zimbabwe. The manner of his departure might yet disgrace the whole continent.


Middle East conflict
Britain abandons allies

Paul Moorcraft
August 9, 2007
Washington Times

The new Brown government in Britain is pontificating about U.S. moral standards in Guantanamo, but at the same time it is behaving abysmally toward its own moral obligations in Iraq. The British Army is moving from engagement to "overwatch" in southern Iraq as it prepares to withdraw in the next few months, almost regardless of concerns in Washington.

Under its current policy, it will be leaving behind those who have helped its forces however. About 20,000 Iraqis have worked for British forces since 2003. Some of these have been killed as collaborators, others have fled to Jordan or Syria. This week attention has been focused on the 91 Iraqi interpreters who still are in British employment.

They have faced two main dangers: the daily risks of bombs and bullets as they accompany British soldiers, but also the even graver threat of horrific torture and death from the militias if they leave their bases to return to visit their families. When the British quit they will be killed as "traitors." Unsurprisingly, they want asylum in Great Britain.

The British government, despite protests by senior serving army officers, has made no special arrangements — technically, each Iraqi has to make his own way to Britain and then join a long queue to seek asylum. Even if the translator managed to surmount these bureaucratic hurdles, his family would still be left at the mercy of the militias.
The shadow Conservative foreign secretary, William Hague, said that looking after these translators is a "matter of honor."

The United States has employed about 5,000 translators, of whom 250 have been murdered. Washington has raised the number of visas from 50 to 500 for Iraqis working with U.S. troops. The waiting list is still six years long, though the United States plans to admit 7,000 Iraqi refugees later this year. Congress is to debate legislation that could allow in another 60,000. This should at least more than cover those who have risked all in helping America.

Spain was compassionate in helping its Iraqi workers when it withdrew. Poland has said it will not desert its Iraqi employees. Last month, Denmark airlifted out 200 Iraqis, including translators and their families.

The United Nation has estimated that 20,000 Iraqis will need to be resettled permanently when all coalition troops leave, to avoid retribution as collaborators.

This is not an easy problem to solve, especially in Britain, where immigration has become a hot political issue. British governments have been remarkably soft on deporting convicted jihadists, or even foreign nationals convicted of crimes such as rape and murder. But loyal Iraqi translators have been given the cold shoulder.

Army officers, especially those who have served in Iraq, are furious, but the political decision-makers are dragging their feet, as they have with Nepalese Gurkha troops who have sought to live in Britain. Since 1997 they have been granted that right. But those who served with distinction in World War II, the Falklands and the first Gulf war have not. A recent test case was Tul Bahadur Pun, 84, who won the highest British medal for valor, the Victoria Cross. He was refused residency after seeking medical treatment in Britain. Eventually a public outcry managed to reverse the decision. This led to a reconsideration of another 2,000 applicants.

I have had the privilege of working alongside Gurkha soldiers, among the toughest and most loyal troops in the world. I also have firsthand experience with Iraqi translators. Quite simply, since so few coalition troops speak Arabic, without the help of these men, Anglo-American forces could not have functioned at all.

Winning this long war is about finding, and keeping, allies. Dumping loyal co-workers is no way to do business. All of the Iraqi translators working with the British — and their families — should be given the option of returning to Britain when the army departs. It will be a long exile, but it is better than death. They should be given medals, thanks and a generous resettlement allowance. And if they so wish, they should be given an opportunity to help the domestic security services, who need loyal Arabic speakers. That is the least these brave men deserve.

The British government should hang its head in shame.

The Long War
Towering jihadist narrative still casts shadows on west

Paul Moorcraft
September 18, 2007
Business Day

WHAT have six years of fighting and worldwide counter-terrorism achieved since the attacks on the World Trade Centre? Bomb plots throughout Europe, defeat in Iraq, a massive boost of the opium crop in Afghanistan, and Iran on the edge of getting nuclear weapons. And, despite a massive price on his head, the perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks is still strutting his stuff. Osama bin Laden’s recent video appearance — his first since 2004 — appeared to be an attempt to reposition himself: as no longer merely a warlord, but the wise spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda faith. His politics have become greener and his beard blacker.

But what is the military reality behind this makeover?

That he is still alive and waging war is a sad reflection on American military power and determination.

But his long-term endgame — the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate — looks no nearer than it did before 9/11.

Not a single Middle Eastern, north African or Asian Muslim regime has been toppled as part of the rebuilding of the caliphate, which al-Qaeda strategists are saying could happen by 2020.

The influential International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, in its annual strategic review published last week, said that the core leadership of al-Qaeda in Pakistan had increased its control and direction of jihadists, especially in western countries.

The institute argues that al-Qaeda has proved very resilient and can still plan terror spectaculars in the west.

Second, its franchises in Iraq and especially in north Africa have not only sworn allegiance but are beginning to move from parochial to global objectives. Worse, the large number of terror plots that have been discovered in Europe, Canada, the Arabian peninsula and the Maghreb display the growing radicalisation of Muslims.

But it is the home-grown terrorism in North America and Europe that is of most concern to western intelligence agencies.

The institute’s report states soberly: “In sum, the US and its allies have failed to deal a death blow to al-Qaeda; the organisation’s ideology appears to have taken root to such a degree that it will require decades to eradicate.”

The 2005 bombings in London have directed attention to the 800000-strong Pakistani community in the UK.

Many young British Pakistanis have accepted al-Qaeda’s “single narrative” — that the sufferings of the Islamic world can be resolved only when the alleged oppression of Muslims at the hands of the unbelievers is brought to an end.

Pakistan is the key problem. The nuclear-armed military dictatorship is very fragile, and on the edge of civil war. The west has been obliged to bolster the regime, despite its deals with the Taliban and other jihadists in Afghanistan and in the ungovernable tribal areas nominally controlled by Pakistan.

But the alternative may be an Islamic regime that is even more amenable to al-Qaeda’s ambitions.

More than 400000 British nationals of Pakistani origin travel to Pakistan each year. Many of the UK-born terrorists trained there. And, for the US, these same British nationals can use the current visa-waiver scheme to freely enter the US.

British counterterrorism co-operation with the US and the European Union has brought an improvement in the intelligence flow, but the numbers required for comprehensive surveillance are challenging, not least because al-Qaeda has seduced an increasing number of “clean-skin” white converts. Arrests this month in Germany have again demonstrated this danger.

In the US, Muslims tend to be better off, better educated and better integrated than in the UK.

Nevertheless, since the attacks of 9/11, the FBI has investigated 12 home-grown plots. Increasingly, young American Muslims are describing themselves as Muslim first and American second.

Deradicalisation programmes, where they exist in Muslim countries, tend to accept the “single narrative” but then encourage nonviolent responses to the perceived injustices being done to their co-religionists in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine/Israel.

In the west, governments have left deradicalisation programmes largely to the mosques, even though many have been subverted by extremists.

In prisons and universities, often breeding grounds for jihad, “moderate” Muslims are urged to dissuade their brothers and sisters; largely in vain.

Meanwhile, among the chattering classes of the unbelievers, pious debates about further integration and dialogue with Muslims have not worked either.

In Africa, in the Sahel states, the US is trying, via its Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, to mix security training with economic and social development. This is the avowed policy of the US military’s new Africa Command.

In SA, the institute report says that while the country has not fallen victim to Islamist terrorism, it has become apparent that within the substantial Muslim population “there is a core of radicalised individuals engaged in facilitating the activities of extremists from other Islamic states, notably Pakistan”.

The republic has become a popular transit destination for al-Qaeda activists, who want to disguise their travel patterns.

South African passports also afford visa-free access to a wide range of destinations, a vulnerability recently acknowledged by Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils.

Though there is a place for muscular military responses to al-Qaeda, while Iraq and southern Afghanistan are battle grounds, many young Muslims will not want to listen to any appeals for compromise.

The choice is stark.

Either a deal must be struck with al-Qaeda — withdraw all western troops from the Middle East and Afghanistan, and let Muslims decide if they want a caliphate. Their religion, their countries, their decision — and meanwhile most will want to sell oil and trade with the west.

Or a decision must be made: if this war is going to last decades, it must be won, but by different means. A concerted western ideological campaign must be waged akin to the strategy that won the Cold War. Soft power might do a lot better than the occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The west’s cultural and economic power might succeed where its tanks and gunships have failed, provided the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its allies show the patience, determination and unity which they have failed to display militarily in Afghanistan, for example.

Non-Muslims will have to take this war far more seriously, as seriously as Muslims do, if it is to be won.

A warning is necessary. If Washington sanctions an attack on the nuclear facilities in Iran, then all bets are off. Then double the duration of the long war and the difficulties in winning it.

And a side bet: Bin Laden will be killed by his fellow Muslims, not western forces.


Middle East conflict
Why We Must Withdraw Now
Paul Moorcraft
October 2006
Sunday Express

Five years after 9/11, pulling ALL Western forces out of the Middle East might be the only long-term solution to the war on terror.


The West is losing this war. If you measure the chaos in Iraq, the economic disruption to the airlines, or the alienation of Muslims in Europe, it is difficult to declare even a drawn game.

Even in ‘multi-cultural’ Britain, if ten passenger aircraft had been blown out of the sky, mosques would have been burning throughout the country. Such polarisation is exactly what the Jihadists want.

A complete military withdrawal from all Islamic lands may well be the only solution. It is the Jihadist ambition, but it would remove nearly all the friction, especially if there were also to be a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian struggle. This is not appeasement, but practical politics.

We are using a military machine designed for the Cold War, not a terror war. The West should play to its strengths – particularly its economic muscle. Intervene – not occupy – only briefly and preferably as part of UN missions.

Whoever rules in the Middle East would want to sell their oil. And if the whole Arab region erupted into chaos then that could force a greener world. A quarter of the US money spent on troops in Iraq could have guaranteed the cleanest and cheapest of electric cars, for example.

The current Lebanese ceasefire may well implode, not least if Jerusalem tries to complete the unfinished US-Israeli business of wiping out Hezbollah. Military solutions to the chronic Israeli-Arab conflict cannot work.

Iraq aside, Hezbollah’s Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has unified Shia and Sunni. The (inevitably temporary) patching up of this centuries-old schism is roughly the equivalent of the Ribbentrop-Molotov deal in 1939, and equally destabilising for Anglo-American strategy.

Hezbollah’s new kind of war could soon be emulated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the provocations of Iran’s loudmouth president, the US eventually will realise that the Iranians, who taught Hezbollah, would deploy the same tactics in their own country, should the (unlikely) military option be taken against Teheran. Iran will be left to acquire nuclear weapons, which may be a minor threat compared with Pakistan’s bomb. Pakistan is a proven training ground for terrorists in India and UK, let alone in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

A new British prime minister could break the Anglo-American military coalition, and November mid-term US elections could lead to Congress slashing military funding, as well as launching investigations into the current policy on torture.

Nevertheless, this military phase of the 30-40 years of future anti-Jihadist conflict could still be won, if the US and UK withdrew rapidly from Iraq, with flags flying and bagpipes playing, and concentrated instead on winning in Afghanistan – the original base of al-Qaeda and the crucible of the 9/11 abomination.

But this week’s NATO fiasco in trying to get more troops demonstrates that history’s biggest and most successful military alliance will not take decisive action in the badlands of southern Afghanistan.

If we fight on with present troop levels what happens? The US humiliatingly withdraws from Iraq as the civil war causes a three-fold partition, and NATO forces eventually succumb to domestic pressure at home and the Taleban retake Kabul.

There is no political stomach for all-out war, so a rapid and orderly Western military withdrawal should come sooner rather than later.

The Anglo-US policy of constructive destabilisation has failed in the sense that regimes have emerged which are not to our taste. Democracy in Lebanon didn’t curb Hezbollah, nor did we much like the Palestinian Hamas victory. Nor did Turkey play ball with the US over the northern invasion route into Iraq in 2003. And Iran has a democracy of sorts; maybe any freely elected government in Teheran would be nationalistic enough to want to develop nuclear power as it sees fit.

To assume that Arabs had as much right to, and facility for, Western democracy was a noble idea. Perhaps the US Neo-cons were right to assume that dethroning tyrants would bring people power, but that does not equate necessarily with a pro-Western democracy.
Worse, people power is much more difficult to navigate than doing deals with generals and kings, ‘our sonofabitches’ during the Cold War. The West wants stability, but it is in the nature of political transformations that long periods of instability result.

Coalition withdrawal from Iraq can hardly make matters worse, and it may be the only way the Baghdad government can secure enough legitimacy to avoid partition.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, decisive military victories led to big security vacuums – in both cases because there were not enough boots on the ground. Afghanistan was ‘doable’ in 2002-3, but resources and troops were siphoned off to Iraq. Supporting President Karzai and empowering Afghan women were also noble aims. But so long as Pakistan plays a double game, and continues to support or tolerate jihadists, winning the war in Afghanistan is mission impossible.

Before Western troops are driven out, a rapid withdrawal makes sense. The elaborate US command structures in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and elsewhere in the region then become largely redundant. Washington would continue to be ultimate guarantor of Israel, though a two-state solution will make that a far less contentious issue.

Britain has occupied Iraq three times and failed to bring peace. During the Raj, Britain failed three times to subdue the Afghans. It is trying again, even though the official policy of destroying opium will turn nearly every Afghan against NATO troops.

Meanwhile, British troops risk daily a repeat of Rorke’s drift, when an isolated garrison was surrounded by Zulus. True, eleven VCs were won, but only after the slaughter of thousands of Brits shortly before.

Bringing the legions home will save many lives, not least those of British troops. It will also remove one of the main grievances of the Islamic world.

In World War Two, General Douglas MacArthur’s promise to return to the Philippines after the US disaster there and Britain’s retreat at Dunkirk allowed both powers to go back as victors in less than five years. This time, though, Britain and America will need a generation to return in moral, not military, strength to the Middle East.


Middle East conflict
Why the west should not kill Bin Laden

Paul Moorcraft
October 5, 2006
Business Day

WARS are supposedly God’s way of teaching Americans geography. Few in the US would ever have heard of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Territories or known that Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns laugh at national frontiers, if it weren’t for Osama bin Laden. He is supposed to be holed up there, somewhere around Waziristan. When Bin Laden was a CIA pin-up boy in the 1980s, I spent time in these parts. Though I have never met the Saudi-Yemeni warlord, he was operating just over the hill from the Mujahedin group that was helping me to make a film on the war against the Russians. Afghan fighters didn’t much like and usually avoided the “Arabs”, as they called them.

In 1996, when Bin Laden was a guest of the Khartoum government, I went out to interview him, but he was kicked out two days before I got there. The US had pressured Sudan’s Islamic regime to force him to leave. Khartoum was told to send Bin Laden anywhere but Somalia. So instead he went to Afghanistan again, as a guest of the Taliban. And the rest is history.

But 9/11 could perhaps have been avoided if US and UK intelligence had paid more heed to Khartoum’s offer: the military regime said it would hand Bin Laden over to the US, and suffer Islamic opprobrium, if Washington ceased treating Sudan like a pariah terrorist state.

At the time the Sudan regime was behaving like a bunch of thugs. Nevertheless, a regime that handed Carlos the Jackal over to the French might have done a deal. Bill Clinton, with hindsight, admitted it was the “biggest mistake” of his presidency.

In Sudan, I met many of Bin Laden’s friends, including his main host, the Islamic firebrand Hassan al-Turabi. Bin Laden’s travel agent bemoaned the loss of his best client. “He regularly used an American Express card,” he explained. Others said that the Saudi warlord would always ask about their children. He also enjoyed talking about the minutiae of construction equipment. But the urbane al-Turabi did admit that the future “Lion of Islam” could also be a bore: “Jihad, jihad, jihad, all the time.”

A Sudanese minister told me that Bin Laden was very angry about his expulsion. “The Saudis and the US didn’t even pay you. You are throwing me out for nothing,” Bin Laden said.

The one thing that works in Sudan is the secret service: the Mukhabarat. Its bosses often boasted that they had Bin Laden under constant watch and in effect he was quarantined. Nor were the CIA that keen to see all their files on Bin Laden and his associates, even after 9/11.

The Sudanese government may be lying in many cases, but serious western intelligence failures impeded the hunt for Bin Laden. Certainly, before the Bush presidency, there were a number of missed opportunities to capture or kill him.

This month spectacular rumours, almost certainly spurious, have been circulating that Bin Laden has died of typhoid. If true, this would have been the best result for the west. Instead of what he wanted, a glorious death in battle, he would have missed his martyrdom.
Knowing what became of him is important, though; otherwise he could take on a sort of “hidden imam” mystique. In death he would have been more powerful than in life.

Worse could be his capture, especially if his trial replicates the fiasco of proceedings against Saddam Hussein. After the British and Americans spent £75m training Iraqi lawyers and judges for this charade, the sixth judge has been appointed. The fifth had said in court that Saddam was not a dictator. It has become a replay of the Baathist show trials, except that the judges and lawyers keep getting killed or sacked.

Five years after 9/11, Bin Laden has not had his day in court. AlQaeda’s formal infrastructure has been badly damaged by western action, though it has now been transformed into more a radical idea rather than an organisation, and hence more difficult to counter. Bin Laden’s star has also been eclipsed by Hezbollah’s Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Bin Laden may have played a useful (western-sponsored) role in defeating the Russians in Afghanistan, but that took a decade. In Islamic perspectives, Nasrallah defeated the Israelis in less than a month.

Bin Laden suffered from a kidney infection in Sudan, and intelligence sources suggest he later underwent dialysis in Pakistan. He was also apparently treated again in early 2002 in Pakistan for a serious wound inflicted by the US-sponsored attack at Tora Bora mountains. In November 2004, Bin Laden recorded a videotape; since then there have been only audio tapes. This led to speculation that al-Qaeda did not want to display their leader’s physical deterioration.

It is unlikely that Bin Laden will now become the emir of the global Islamic caliphate he wanted to create. And as long as Pakistan, especially its intelligence services, plays a double game, his capture is unlikely. Should the 49-year-old warlord die, his immediate successor is likely to be his scholarly deputy, Dr Ayman alZawahiri, though the Saudi millionaire’s large brood of sons may eventually get a look in, too.

Ironically, the failure to capture or kill the archenemy may well be in Washington’s best interest. There has been no conspiracy to permit his freedom, just missed opportunities. Saddam was found in a hole, but his trial has resurrected his reputation.

While it denies justice, a squalid diseased demise in a hovel in the tribal areas is the most convenient closure. Bin Laden’s death at the hands of US forces might make Americans feel better about 9/11, but it would also fire up jihad in the Islamic world. It could also lead to a false sense of security, like the jubilation after Saddam was captured.


Retreat may be the surest way to advance
Posted to the web on: 14 September 2006
Paul Moorcraft
Business Day

FIVE years after 9/11, pulling all coalition forces out of the Middle East might be the only long-term solution to the war on terror. The west is losing its sadly self-fulfilling war on what President George Bush called “Islamic fascists”. If you measure the chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the economic disruption to the airlines, or the alienation of Muslims in Europe, it is difficult to declare even a drawn game. Let no one fool themselves in “multicultural” Britain: if 10 passenger jets had been blown out of the sky, mosques would have been burning throughout the country. Such polarisation is what the jihadists want.
A military withdrawal from all Islamic lands may well be the only solution. It is the jihadist ambition, but it would remove nearly all the friction, especially if there were also to be a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. The presence of western troops is simply not working.

Whoever rules would want to sell their oil. And if the whole Arab region erupted into chaos — instead of the Islamic renaissance — then that could force a greener world. A quarter of the money spent on troops in Iraq could guarantee the cleanest and cheapest of electric cars, for example.

Hezbollah’s perceived victory in Lebanon could escalate the war on terror to horrific proportions, not least in the US and UK, especially if chemical or biological weapons are deployed. Israel’s version of the US shock and awe failed. The Lebanese cease-fire may well implode, not least if Israel tries to complete the unfinished US-Israeli business of wiping out Hezbollah. But military solutions to the Israeli-Arab conflict cannot work. More war will play into the hands of jihadists everywhere.

Hezbollah has designed a new kind of war: the sophistication of a national army, but the invisibility of a guerrilla force. This deadly hybrid could soon be emulated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite Iran’s highly irritating filibusters, the US eventually will realise that the Iranians, who taught Hezbollah, would deploy the same tactics in their own country, should the military option be taken against Tehran. Iran will be left to acquire nuclear weapons, which may be a minor threat compared with Pakistan’s bomb. Pakistan is a proven training ground for terrorists in Bombay and Burnley, let alone in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kashmir.

Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has become a much bigger hero than Osama bin Laden, who could never unify Shiite and Sunni in the way Hezbollah has done. The (inevitably temporary) patching up of this centuries-old schism is roughly the equivalent of the Ribbentrop-Molotov deal in 1939, and equally destabilising for Anglo-American strategy. Throughout the Islamic world there is a growing acceptance that the Muslim renaissance can come only through terror and war.

After the November midterm elections in the US, congress could start cutting back on money for the Iraq war. The US humiliatingly withdraws from Iraq as the civil war causes a threefold partition, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) forces eventually succumb to domestic pressure at home and the Taliban retake Kabul. The tragic history of the Middle East would suggest that, for the west, this pessimistic scenario is more likely if the war on terror continues. If so, a rapid and orderly western military withdrawal should come sooner rather than later.

Remove the hard power — the troops — and the soft power arguments of trade might be far more effective. True, Barbary pirates might replace Nato patrols in the Mediterranean, but there may well be less chaos and killing than in today’s Iraq.

The Anglo-US policy of constructive destabilisation has failed in the sense that regimes have emerged which are not to our taste. Democracy in Lebanon didn’t curb Hezbollah, nor did we much like the Hamas victory. Nor did Turkey play ball with the US over the northern invasion route into Iraq in 2003. And Iran has a democracy of sorts; maybe any freely elected government in Tehran would be nationalistic enough to want to develop nuclear power as it sees fit.

To assume that Arabs had as much right to, and facility for, western democracy was a noble idea. Perhaps the US neocons were right to assume that dethroning tyrants would bring people power, but that does not equate necessarily with a democracy that is pro-western. Worse, people power is much more difficult to navigate than doing deals with generals and kings. The west wants stability, but it is in the nature of political transformations that often long periods of instability result.

Coalition withdrawal from Iraq can hardly make matters worse, and it may be the only way the current Baghdad government can secure enough legitimacy to avoid partition.
Afghanistan was “doable” in 2002-03, but resources and troops were siphoned off to Iraq. Leaving the country to its own miseries after the Soviet withdrawal was a mistake, which led to al-Qaeda terrorist camps. Supporting President Hamid Karzai and empowering Afghan women were also noble aims. But so long as Pakistan plays a double game, and continues to tolerate jihadists in Afghanistan, Kashmir and inside Pakistan, winning the war in Afghanistan, even with double the present number of troops, is impossible.

The US command structures in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and residual forces in Saudi Arabia then become largely redundant. US naval deployments and useful minor contributions to United Nations operations could continue. And Washington would continue to be ultimate guarantor of Israel, though after its troop withdrawals and the establishment of a two-state solution that may well be a far less contentious issue.
Before western troops are driven out, a rapid withdrawal makes sense. Britain has occupied Iraq three times and failed to bring peace. In Palestine, London ordered a withdrawal in 1947 because it did not want British troops caught in the crossfire of a civil war. But that is what is happening now in Iraq. During the Raj, Britain failed three times to subdue the Afghans. It is trying again, even though the policy of destroying opium will turn nearly every Afghan against Nato troops. Exactly 50 years ago the British and French botched the seizure of the Suez Canal.

Bringing the legions home will save many lives, not least those of British and American troops. It will also remove one of the main grievances of the Islamic world way beyond the sands of Arabia and southern Afghanistan.

General Douglas MacArthur’s promise to return to the Philippines after the US disaster there and Britain’s retreat at Dunkirk allowed both powers to go back as victors in less than five years. This time, though, Britain and America will need a generation to return in moral strength to the Middle East. And, next time, they had better leave their troops behind.

The future of Zimbabwe

Passing parade in Havana, Harare
This article appeared in Business Day (Johannesburg) on 16 August 2006

DAILY, far more Zimbabweans are dying needlessly than civilians in Lebanon. This was the dramatic point made by veteran Zimbabwe journalist Michael Hartnack in practically his last words before he died late last month. Despite the power and water cuts, fuel queues and all the rest of the daily hassles in present-day Zimbabwe, Hartnack remarked that he was still one of the lucky ones. “The unlucky ones are out there in the freezing night dying at 3200 a week, which is a lot more than Lebanon.”

Robert Mugabe is not directly attacking the west and does not have any oil, so who cares what he does in his own country? And even for those who might do something about one of Africa’s nastiest dictators, Iraq and Afghanistan have drained most of their interventionist tendencies. If the US intelligence agencies weren’t so pre-occupied elsewhere, they might accuse Mugabe of supplying Congo uranium to his old pals in North Korea.

In March 2003, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair told a British minister during a discussion about the need to invade Iraq: “If it were down to me, I’d do (invade) Zimbabwe as well.”
Like Fidel Castro, Mugabe at 82 is a great survivor. Castro may be trying to create a dynasty by handing over to his brother Raul. Mugabe has less faith in family but has favoured a former girlfriend as a possible successor, Joyce Mujuru or Teurai Ropa (“Spill Blood”, to use her nom de guerre).

The Americans tried invasions, blockades, sanctions and assassination but it looks as though Castro will die in his bed. Will Africa’s great dictator enjoy the same fate? Unfortunately, his country may have reached its own terminal state before then.
Zimbabwe has the world’s fastest shrinking economy and the worst inflation rate — now about 1000%. As United Nations humanitarian chief, Jan Egeland, put it, the country is in meltdown. Services have collapsed and cannot deal with the AIDS pandemic that has infected one-third of the population.

Life expectancy has dropped from an average of 62 to 38 years. Unemployment stands at 70%. More than 5-million people are on the brink of starvation. At least 4-million have fled, with perhaps 2,5-million Zimbabweans in SA. Most of the professional middle class has left.

Many black Zimbabweans will freely admit that conditions were better under Ian Smith. Smith said that a Mugabe victory would bring the decimation of the Ndebele, then the destruction of the economy by driving out the white farmers. Yesterday, Smith’s stubbornness may have made that a self-fulfilling prophecy. Today Mugabe is the problem, but he won’t go. How can he be persuaded?

A military coup is unlikely, partly because a creeping coup has already taken place. The security apparatus is full of Mugabe’s Zezuru clan, and they have been amply rewarded. The boss keeps a tight rein on his military mates in the new National Security Council. Mugabe still has some residual popularity in Mashonaland.

Many within in his own Zanu (PF) party are praying for him to quit or die. Although he is due to leave office in 2008, he may try to stay on.

Mugabe has never named a formal successor, which could mean chaos if he were to die in office. Three key factions jostle for power. Foremost is the group around Vice- President Joyce Mujuru; second, followers of the now disgraced Emmerson Mnangagwa; and those remnants of Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) who hope an Ndebele might get the top job.

Mujuru is a Zezuru, however; another Zezuru victory could upset the clan balancing act, especially among the Karanga, the largest Shona-speaking group. This is where the main opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, the head of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) could benefit. Though he comes from a minority Shona-speaking tribe, he is popular among the Ndebele. But while the electoral system is so fixed in favour of the ruling party, the MDC is unlikely to defeat even the most fractious Zanu (PF)..

So no western invasion and little chance of internal reform; that leaves SA. Pretoria tried to bring the MDC and Zanu (PF) together, to little effect. Then it pinned its hopes on a so-called moderate faction emerging in the ruling party. No such luck with Mugabe’s mastery of divide and rule. The African Union and the Southern African Development Community have been toothless. Commonwealth smart sanctions have been water off a duck’s backside.

More recently it looked as though Kofi Annan might offer Mugabe a deal: an economic rescue package in exchange for a deadline to quit office, maybe at the 2008 presidential election. Crucially, there would also be a deal on immunity from prosecution.
All these forlorn moves indicate that President Thabo Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy has failed. SA has the power to dethrone Mugabe immediately, so why hasn’t it?
In 1976 prime minister John Vorster pulled the plug on his white kin by cutting fuel and ammunition; the rebel Smith had to comply almost immediately by formally accepting majority rule. SA put its own national interest first. So does Mbeki have less courage than Vorster?

In the west, SA is perceived as the regional superpower. SA has the hard power: it could cut off fuel and electricity and bring Mugabe to heel almost overnight. If it did this it might be branded as a puppet of the US.

From a western perspective, quiet diplomacy amounts to doing nothing. Prof Jack Spence, Britain’s leading expert on SA, said this allows western liberals “to argue with some justice that black liberation solidarity of the kind that links Mbeki with Mugabe trumps human rights and profoundly damages SA’s claims to be a good and influential citizen of the international community”.

Mbeki’s quiet constructive enga-gement was based on the premise that direct confrontation would ultimately damage South African interests. Ironically, that is what has happened. Mugabe is badly damaging SA, the region and indeed the continent. If Zimbabwe implodes completely, it may be too late.

If Mugabe is the problem, then Mbeki is the only solution. It might be unfair to burden Pretoria with the burden of Zimbabwe’s future, but that’s the way it is. Nelson Mandela could and did condemn Mugabe and Desmond Tutu could describe him as “a caricature of an African dictator”. Unfortunately Mbeki seems to defer to the older revolutionary hero in Harare.

The Zimbabwe crisis is causing major rifts in the ANC but, for the president, the more vocal criticism of Harare by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (natural allies of Tsvangarai) and by the South African Communist Party must be embarrassing.
More important than party unity is the danger of the land issue spiralling out of control. More than 20 times more white South African farmers have been murdered than white farmers in Zimbabwe. SA, where murder is underreported, is a powder keg: the actual number of killings may outnumber Iraq’s.

Also, the flood of Zimbabwean refugees is making South Africans much more xenophobic. Above all, having a failed, or indeed rogue, state on its borders does no good for foreign investors’ confidence in the region. It also affects tourism to SA.

Above all, it is a question of image. The South African government is seen in the west as implicit in all that Mugabe does. The president’s stance over AIDS might have been forgiven as unfortunate ignorance but tolerating Mugabe is seen as either plain stupidity or deliberately condoning the dictator.

I interviewed Mugabe at length for Time magazine when he first returned to the then Salisbury in January 1980. After the dullards in the Rhodesian Front, it was a breath of fresh air to talk to such an intelligent, articulate man.

Above all, I believed his sincerity about racial reconciliation. So how did he become a monster? There were early signs — within a year his army had started to wipe out the Ndebele. Anyone who challenged him was destroyed; the white farmers whom he accused of helping the MDC, then 500000 urban squatters’ homes and shops were destroyed because they might vote for the MDC.

Nothing will stand in Mugabe’s way except death, or SA.
Perhaps it is time for the statesman to emerge in Mbeki.